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
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff

FROM: 

25X1

SUBJECT: Response to DCI's Requirements in "State of the CIA" Speech


REFERENCE: DDO Memorandum, subject: "Follow-up to DCI Speech," dated 25 January 1984

1. Forwarded herewith is a Statement of Goals, Principles and Standards for CIA which represents  attempt to furnish an improved version of the initial draft disseminated by the DCI's office on 24 January 1984. This statement has been formulated from numerous suggestions and draft statements emanating from various branch and staff components in the Division. Please note that the People and Management sections have been combined into a People section since one Division component aptly observed that management, after all, is people and it would be difficult to divide one from the other. Several components observed that the Measure of Results section might profitably be deleted because it is so difficult to quantify the Agency's results and that our business is really intangible - providing intelligence, enhancing national security, providing advance warning of crises (and perhaps helping to avert them), etc. The majority of Division contributors, however, felt that some measurement of what we do needs to be made and, in the spirit of bringing forth a goals statement which includes accountability, we have retained this element in the statement.

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2. Also submitted with the statement of goals are several of the more thoughtful recommendations, suggestions, or deliberation points received from Division components. The Division takes no official position on these papers but is forwarding them in the hopes they will be useful to those deliberating on ways and means to improve the operations of the Agency and achieve the standard of excellence we seek for our Organization.

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Attachments 

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

S E C R E T

STATEMENT OF GOALS, PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR CIA

Purpose. To provide accurate, comprehensive intelligence information, analysis and support to a broad range of consumers that is timely and best suited for: enhancing national security and bolstering policy; maintaining the integrity of the economy and the critical technological superiority required to ensure its growth; helping to guard against foreign threats of all kinds, including military, political/subversive, economic, hostile intelligence activities, terrorism and narcotics.

Organization. CIA has a leadership role within the intelligence community. This requires that it work closely with other members of the community to ensure that consumer needs are well-defined and that roles and responsibilities of community members are clearly understood and well-coordinated. Within CIA, operating elements are critically inter-dependent and the particular responsibilities and contributions of each should be both respected and utilized appropriately to achieve the goals and objectives set for the Agency. CIA must maintain sufficient flexibility and openmindedness in its organizational style and management of resources to ensure rapid and effective response to fast-breaking, unforeseen challenges and requirements.

Ethics. Our activities are conducted under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Every member of the Agency must be sensitive to the letter and spirit of these rules and manifest the highest degree of integrity and moral responsibility in performance and conduct. We should at all times exemplify the finest traditions of service to our country.

People. CIA's people are the root source of its capabilities. The strength of the organization is dependent on the quality, dedication and loyalty of its people, and its future evolution is related to the opportunities it affords for their professional and personal growth. Excellence must be rewarded, talent nurtured and we must aim to recognize and foster leadership and skills through training, travel and assignments. Management personnel are selected for their ability to inspire enthusiasm and promote excellence by example. CIA's management must continually strive to foster initiative and creativity, by allowing the individual freedom of action in attaining well-defined objectives, while requiring efficiency, accountability, and effectiveness at all levels. As the needs of the Organization are diverse, so the personnel we require represent all strata of our nation. Academic, social and experience backgrounds are varied but a common thread consists of selflessness and devotion to our nation, coupled with commitment to be part of the best intelligence service in the free world.

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Measure of Results. Our results are evaluated by consumers within the community and the Executive Branch, and by the Congress. We must ensure that these results are the best that collective effort can achieve, with community input always sought. The best measure of value is the extent of actual consumer reliance on our products and services. Our "no surprises" policy calls for ensuring that decision-makers do not have to act in an intelligence vacuum. The cost of truly central intelligence service being considerable, our resources must be marshalled with particular care and we must constantly ensure protection of our sources and methodology.

Standards. We seek to demonstrate in everything we do:

- performance of the highest quality;
- ethics and integrity of the highest order;
- outstanding skills, self-realization, and optimum use of resources;
- utilization of the most effective technologies;
- capability and flexibility to meet difficult and unforeseen challenge;
- a high sense of community and purpose that transcends Directorate concerns;
- leadership and recognition as the best intelligence service in the world.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

We should move towards more directed assignments for junior and middle level officers.

We should have a restatement of the commitment of officers in the DO to serve abroad where needed.

We should define and disseminate more policy on assignments - length of tours, time frame for serving in the states, etc., and adhere to these policies in a fair and equitable fashion.

We should create a pay structure that would give secretaries more incentive to serve abroad, and afford them the opportunity for solid secretarial training courses/seminars outside the CIA (perhaps one or two per year).

Provide each individual the maximum opportunity for growth through training and job assignment.

We would like to see the door open for those who qualify for conversion to professional status. How about para-professional status for IA's with a range of GS-09 to GS-12 or something similar?

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#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The promotion system as practiced within the DDO is unfair to individuals in operations training, language training, and/or rotational assignments, given the emphasis on "recruiting" per se. This creates morale problems for employees in operations or language training and/or rotational assignments since they are "uncompetitive" with their peers. Over the long haul this will result in a paring down of the number of employees willing to take training or rotationals, and could lead to a point where the Agency will not have sufficient "linguists" in the future.

This problem might be solved by greater use of "incentive awards" and "QSI's" (Quality Step Increases). Many managers unfortunately do not make maximum, or even sufficient, use of the rewards systems in motivating subordinates.

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### RECOMMENDATIONS

That senior Directorate management do more to encourage and promote broader contacts by Division management with all Division personnel. Division chiefs and their deputies should spend more time out of their offices in visiting branches and staffs for several reasons: (1) To obtain a better understanding of their units' operational progress and problems; (2) To convey an interest in subordinates' work and be better attuned to their needs and contributions; (3) To become better acquainted with junior personnel and to better appreciate their outlook and views on clandestine work; (4) To display leadership in a way which is personal and which reaches a greater audience; (5) To take advantage of new ideas and suggestions put forth by small unit leaders and members which frequently surface in such management-initiated contacts.

Broader contacts of this nature can be both planned and spontaneous. The point is to have the Division chief or deputy get out among his "troops" instead of only being the ones visited. This can have tremendous mutual benefits for those in charge and those who are being directed. It is a form of the "MBWA" (Management By Wandering Around) theory which is promoted by many of the excellent business concerns in the U.S. and is quite successful in bringing about better performance. This technique is also a way of getting leadership to listen more intently and regularly to those whose thoughts and ideas can often generate new procedures for the betterment of our operational methodology.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

The "Organization" section should contain some sort of statement that addresses the need for a much greater cross fertilization of ideas and personnel in the four directorates, in particular between the DO and the DI.

The "People" section is a disaster. This Agency must get out from under the oppression of the Office of Personnel Management. The assumption that an Intelligence Agency can be run well under the umbrella of the Civil Service is one that needs to be reconsidered seriously. The distinction between clerical and professional should be eliminated. This arbitrary distinction is a negative, not positive approach toward personnel motivation and development. Likewise, the Agency must be in a position so that it can compete in the open job market in the employment of computer and high-tech personnel. (I have found that both ODP and IMS are impossible to work with because they are not staffed with high quality personnel. The computer services IMS, in particular, provides are a disgrace because there are not enough personnel and those who are there are not very competent.)

Some thoughts on the "Management" section. The Agency suffers seriously from the fallacy of assumed constraints, a trait most easily demonstrated by the fact that in all likelihood most of those who read my comments in the preceding paragraph react by saying to themselves, "impossible." By the time a person rises to the management level, he or she has become unconsciously inculcated by working with the "system" to the extent that their creativity is impaired. The Agency should also seek to move away from the "management by memo" (or CYA) syndrome. This methodology builds extensive delays into even the most simple of decisions, which compounds in the aggregate into ponderous management decisions and inefficient use of scarce secretarial resources.

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## The CIA

### What We Are

Responding both to need and opportunity in a relatively few years, the CIA has become an organization of exceptional importance. With that accomplishment has come a heavy responsibility to be the best intelligence organization in the world. Confirming that image has been difficult but rewarding, for goals have been clarified, standards set high and fundamental principles well established. All these give assurance that the Agency can be truly central in the fullest sense of the word.

### What we Seek

Effective coordination of the Intelligence Community's efforts requires strong leadership on the CIA's part. That leadership comes from excellence in product and service in support of national security interests. Such excellence comes principally from our people, whose high quality is tapped through enlightened management that maintains the Agency's pioneering spirit. Only by adapting and using the best in management techniques and experience, will the Agency continue to attract and hold the best talent available.

Basic philosophy counts most for the CIA's success--not just "can do," but "can do right!" Right in terms of adherence to the law, and right in terms of responsiveness to the democratic system in which we operate.

As burgeoning demand for its products and services causes the CIA to increase its basic capabilities, we must maintain those attributes of smallness that have served so well over the years: not action vs. rules, however, but action and rules; risk taking, yes, but with careful weighing of return; and finally self-discipline to go with constant concern for the consumer.

### What We Can Do

With enlightened management the key to meeting future demands, improved internal communication becomes our watchword. The values of our employees must be closely shared by spanning generations of life and professional experience both. The decentralization that characterizes our organization facilitates such interpersonal communication, and our strong central authority provides the impetus. Communication that is truly two-way will help to bring out the creativity and commitment that bring high productivity. The same open communication will ensure continuation of the core integrity that drives CIA's quest for truth.

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Freedom from politicization is ensured not by rules alone but by full understanding of our mission and appreciation of its uniqueness. Such understanding comes with time and training, and the latter must be very full indeed. Not only do our employees need to know their business, they must also know their country--its involvements and its requirements.

We must, and we can, develop and maintain leadership and management of the highest quality and a unique work environment characterized by acceptance and achievement of singularly high standards. The synergism that is CIA remains the ultimate guarantor of our future.

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